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THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT:  
PRESENTING A COMPLEX APPROACH1 
 




Middle powers have traditionally played an important role in the international system. 
Nowadays, the label of middle power possesses relevant political implications and thus 
theorizing about middle powers is more significant than ever before. However, there is a 
lack of exact and complex middle power definition in academic as well as in political area. 
Hence, in the present study, an overview of the development of middle power theorizing 
from its beginning up to the present was offered in form of a literature review. Subsequently, 
the main conceptualizations of middle power were compared, the advantages and 
disadvantages of each particular attitude emphasized and a complex approach toward 
defining middle power was proposed. The results show that the complex approach towards 
the conceptualization of middle powers employs the strengths of previous approaches and 
overcomes their weaknesses. The emphasis on the relative position of a state in the power 
pyramid is based on the belief that this position, in combination with value orientation and 
self-image, affects both the state’s actions and its ability to create conditions for the 
functioning of the international system and the ability to influence the basic parameters of 
the international system. 
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Middle powers have formed an inseparable part of the international system. 
Nowadays, referred to as “ideology”, “doctrine”, “role”, “guide”, “myth” 
(Gecelovsky, 2009), or “theoretical construct” (Cotton, 2013), the label of middle 
power possesses significant political implications, which makes theorizing about 
middle powers something more than an academic exercise. On the one hand, 
policy-makers in many developed as well as developing countries are highly 
motivated to use the term in their public rhetoric because they perceive it as 
geopolitically significant and politically resonant. In this sense, the self-affiliation 
with the middle power category is used as a foreign policy tool – to claim power 
and gain a bigger share of influence and prestige in the international system 
(Behringer, 2013; Carr, 2014; Chapnick, 1999; Patience, 2014). On the other 
hand, we would hardly hear states such as France or Great Britain discussing 
the middle power concept because of their fear of being forced to accept that 
they are no longer “great”. As A. Chapnick bluntly put it: “Today’s so-called 
middle powers are not really middle powers and the true middle powers do not 
want to be regarded as such” (Chapnick, 1999, p. 79). 
From our perspective, the attitude of K. Waltz, distinguishing superpowers 
and small states and paying attention only to superpowers in the power analysis 
(Waltz, 1979), was outdated even in the Cold War and cannot be fully accepted 
when analysing current world politics. After all, H. Morgenthau had convincingly 
argued long before Waltz for a more precise analysis of power distribution 
(Morgenthau, 1961). The ongoing academic middle power debate began after 
the end of Second World War (WWII) against the background of the Australian 
and Canadian foreign and security policy emancipation. In the post-WWII 
academic literature, five main definitional approaches towards middle power can 
be identified: positional (hierarchical), identity-based, behavioural, functional, 
and systemic. This does not necessarily mean that relevant authors all use the 
same labels; it means that they have the same things in mind within the 
operationalization framework. 
The widely perceived lack of definitional clarity of the middle power concept 
has caused more and more scholars to introduce their own refinements of the 
concept, attempting to escape from the impasse of inconclusive middle power 
theorizing. Having said this, we see a strong case for offering an overview of the 
development of middle power theorizing from its beginning up to the present. 
First of all, the article compares the main conceptualizations of middle power 
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and sheds light on their commonalities and differences. Secondly, it shows the 
advantages and disadvantages of each particular attitude and finally, it 
proposes a complex approach toward defining middle power.  
When thinking about the middle power concept and its contribution to the 
theoretical International Relations (IR) debate, it is its historic roots lying in 
international politics and not in the theory of international relations that should 
be taken into account. The modern middle power concept was born against the 
background of debating the post-WWII world order, first used by the Australian 
Minister of External Affairs H. V. Evatt, in order to secure Australian interests. 
Politicians actively applied the middle power rhetoric as a part of diplomatic 
efforts aiming to confirm the emancipation of the Australian foreign and security 
policy from Great Britain (Ungerer, 2007). As C. Ungerer states: “As the largest 
Allied power in the Southwest Pacific area, Evatt expected that Australia would 
be afforded a special position in the UN security structures commensurate with 
its perceived regional responsibilities” (Ungerer, 2007, p. 541). The same 
motivation can be identified in the Canadian case. At that time, Canada assisted 
in forging the main Western security institution, NATO, to connect North 
American and West European security. To cut a long story short, Australia and 
Canada wanted to gain a privileged position in the post-WWII international 
system and self-identification with middle-powerhood was one of the many tools 
that helped to achieve this goal (Ravenhill, 1998). Therefore, in the first post-
WWII decade, “the middle powers were those states who had fought alongside 
the Great Power allies and who had made a demonstrable commitment to the 
war effort. Being a middle power was a function of relative military capabilities 
— sufficient to warrant inclusion in the post-war peace negotiations, but clearly 
not as significant when compared to overwhelming military resources of the 
great powers” (Ungerer, 2007, p. 548). The ongoing debate about new or 
emerging middle powers also reflects the aspiration of certain countries for a 
middle power status, as this label has a certain reputation in their societies and 
geopolitical resonance. As D. Nolte explains: “While traditional middle powers 
are, first and foremost, defined by their role in international politics, the new 
middle powers are, first of all, regional powers (or regional leaders) and, in 
addition, middle powers (with regard to their power resources) on a global scale. 
Justifying a special position in the international system using the middle power 
rhetoric represents a very important similarity between the set of traditional and 
emerging middle powers” (Nolte, 2010, p. 890). 
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The concept of middle power has been causing a considerable amount of 
controversy among IR scholars. The main reason – as is often the case in IR – 
is its definitional ambiguity. The middle power concept has been described as 
rarely defined (Chapnick, 2000, p. 188), problematic (David-Roussel, 1998, p. 
134), conceptually confused and theoretically contested (Patience, 2014, p. 
213), lacking conceptual clarity (Gecelovsky, 2009, p. 79), tautological (Jordaan, 
2003, p. 166), selective (Ungerer, 2007, p. 539) or ambiguous (Hynek, 2004, p. 
33; Chapnick, 1999, p. 73). The definitional problems have led many scholars to 
more or less question the meaningfulness and utility of the middle power 
concept (Frühling, 2007; Stairs, 1998; Patience, 2014, p. 210) or even conclude 
that it should be confined to the “analytical dustbin” (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 310). 
The state of the art is further complicated by the proliferation of definitions of 
middle powers with little reference to previous studies (Ping, 2005). The middle 
power theory is thus thought to be “mired, and without a clear path forward” 
(Cooper, 2011, p. 323). In addition, there is a very strong tendency in the 
relevant scholarly literature towards providing a definition of middle powers that 
allows Australia and Canada to be classified as such. 
On the other hand, there are also many advocates of the middle power 
concept. Despite the definitional ambiguities, middle power theorizing has been 
a “thriving cottage industry” (Cooper, 2011, p. 318) for decades, especially in 
those countries that traditionally identified themselves as middle powers. The 
lack of consensus on the criteria for classifying states as middle powers has 
been the main reason why very little comparative work on middle power foreign 
policies has been conducted (Patience, 2014, p. 213). There is, however, an 
extensive number of single case studies in the middle power literature. Not 
surprisingly, most scholarly attention has been given to Canada (e.g. Chapnick, 
2000; David-Roussel, 1998; Gecelovsky, 2009) and Australia (e.g. Carr, 2014; 
Ungerer, 2007; Ravenhill, 1998) as two of the most prominent examples of 
middle powers. Other case studies devoted to the traditional middle powers 
have usually covered regions such as Scandinavia or Benelux (e.g. Cooper, 
2011; Behringer, 2013; Pratt, 1989). With the proliferation of the so-called 
emerging middle powers, numerous case studies have appeared, exploring 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (e.g. Belanger-Mace, 1997; Wood, 1988; 
Lechini, 2007), India (e.g. Lechini, 2007; Nayar-Paul, 2003; Mellor, 1979), 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Ping, 2005), Iran and Syria (e.g. Ehteshami-
Hinnesbusch, 1997; Samhat, 2000), Japan and South Korea (e.g. Rozman, 
2007; Cox, 1989; Cotton, 2013), Singapore (Tan, 1999), South Africa (e.g. 
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Piknerová, 2013; Schoeman, 2000; Ozkan, 2006), South Korea (Cotton, 2013; 
Rozman, 2007), and Turkey (Engin-Baba, 2015; Yalcin, 2012).  
This diverse list of states under scrutiny perfectly illustrates the elasticity, 
inconsistency, and subjectivity of the attempts to classify states as middle 
powers (Cooper, 2011, p. 319). It proves that the term middle power has been 
used as a catch-all phrase in order to refer to a variety of states that do not fit 
the description of either “great powers” or “small powers” (David-Roussel, 1998, 
p. 134). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the middle power concept, when 
conceptualized properly and in a complex way, cannot be a powerful tool for 
classifying states and analysing their foreign and security policies. In the 
following parts of the article, a review of the main definitional approaches to the 
study of the middle power concept is presented and based on their analysis a 
complex approach to the middle power concept is proposed.  
 
1 The Positional Approach 
Power is the central concept of IR. Power can be defined narrowly as control 
over military resources (Baldwin, 2002) or in a more complex way as the 
relationship between two states (Nye, 2002). The positional approach, 
stemming from the realist theory of international relations, originated in order to 
differentiate middle powers from small states. The hierarchical, multilayer 
international system creates preconditions for the creation of more categories of 
states. IR has traditionally studied the most powerful states and operated with a 
power/non-power dichotomy. However, particularly owing to the consequences 
of the WWII, it became evident that some small states were gaining power and 
influence. Therefore, while they were excluded from the group of small states, 
they also could not be classified as superpowers (Bothwell, 2011). This made 
space for conceptualizing another category of powers, in which the middle 
power concept can also be included. As R. W. Murray states: “Middle powers 
hold a special status in the international system because on the one hand they 
are not quite powerful enough to be great. On the other hand they are also not 
so insignificant to be minor” (Murray, 2013, p. 90).  
The positional approach tries to create a hierarchy of states according to 
their material sources of power; i.e. power is reduced to the property of certain 
material resources. In this approach, power is perceived very narrowly, not as 
an ability to assert one’s interests in resolving controversial issues in 
international politics, but as a proportion of the sum of the state’s material 
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capacities in comparison to the capacities of other states. These are relatively 
easily quantifiable attributes, such as the size of the territory, population, gross 
domestic product (GDP), military capacity, defence expenses or available 
natural resources (Behringer, 2013, p. 11; Carr, 2014, p. 71-72). However, it is a 
mistake to take into account only military power, as M. Wight does in his 
definition. He asserts that middle power is “a power with such military strength, 
resources and strategic position that in peacetime great powers bid for its 
support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great 
power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the 
great power can hope to gain by attacking it” (Wight, 1978). Currently, the 
positional attitude usually goes far beyond analysing only military capacities. For 
demonstration, J. H. Ping uses the following nine criteria: (1) population, (2) 
geographic area, (3) military expenditure, (4) GDP, (5) GDP real growth, (6) 
value of exports, (7) gross national income per capita, (8) trade as a percentage 
of GDP, and (9) life expectancy at birth (Ping, 2005).  
Among further possible indicators determining state’s total material 
capacities are human capital, measurable by the average accomplished level of 
education, people’s literacy or the state’s technological level. These are 
examined by means of the state’s expenses on research and development 
(Treverton-Jones, 2005, p. 5).  
At the same time, economic indicators are also considered. In addition to the 
size of the GDP and per capita GDP, there are also access to capital, which 
concerns both domestic economic sources and capacities, and the state’s ability 
to employ global resources for its domestic activities. An important role is also 
played by state institutions and political structures, of which e.g. the level of 
corruption or size of the administration are regarded as crucial indicators. 
Furthermore, there are also indicators pertaining to values, trust, social capital, 
social structure with an emphasis on the aspects of social stratification, ethnic 
and class distribution, as well as ways in which citizens cooperate and mutually 
act in political and economic relations (Treverton-Jones, 2005, p. 5-6). In sum, a 
proper positional approach goes far beyond a simple analysis of the correlation 
of military forces. Using a positional attitude, A. Carr assumes that “in the 
modern system, with 193 sovereign states recognized by the United Nations 
(2013), middle powers are expected to be found within the first 20 states when 
ranked on significant quantitative measures, with no significance attended to the 
states which end up at the median point, ranked at 80–90 on a listing of GDP, 
military strength or population” (Carr, 2014, p. 72). 
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In IR literature, critical voices gradually started to appear that regarded the 
positional attitude as insufficient. The first problem was that of objectivity. 
Because the definitional criteria for analysing middle power are ascribed by the 
researchers themselves, there is a risk that a state’s middle power status might 
be subjective. N. Hynek demonstrates the weaknesses of this attitude on C. 
Holbraad’s (1984) and L. Neack’s (1993) texts. As Hynek further stated: “Both 
Holbraaďs and Neack's analyses suffer from a lack of emphasis on the issues 
of intersubjectivity and the social construction of reality” (Hynek, 2004, p. 36). 
Hynek goes on to claim: “First of all, one needs to abandon the 'objective' and 
utility-maximizing rationalist logic that characterizes neo-realist and utilitarian-
liberal analyses of foreign policy. Secondly, a constructivist theory of foreign 
policy based on the logic of appropriateness needs to be brought into focus” 
(Hynek, 2004, p. 40) 
After all, one can agree with the necessity to take into account constructivist 
theories for the middle power conceptualization. Yet, we feel it is not necessary 
to a priori refute the objectivist, positional attitude. It is essential to use the 
criteria, which are generally agreed on within international relations as an 
academic discipline to be relevant for comparison of material resources of 
states’ power. There is general consensus within international relations that 
these criteria are the size of the economy, military capacities, number of 
inhabitants, size of the territory and the country’s possession of key resources 
during the given historical era. Consequently, one can discuss criteria such as 
cultural influence, quality of science, quality of the country’s educational system, 
diplomatic abilities of the given state and undoubtedly also the country’s 
possession of key strategic resources. The advantage of using these additional 
criteria is that the final image of the country’s power position is less restricted. 
However, the disadvantage is surely the difficulty of precisely measuring many 
factors, which considerably undermines the advantage of the positional model.  
Last but not least, one must take into account that these material and 
measurable factors must be perceived in their synergy. If we were to examine 
the individual resources mentioned above in isolation, the positions of countries 
inter se need not objectively correspond to the state’s power. For example, a 
state may have a vast territory but a small number of inhabitants. Yet if we 
consider these indicators in their configuration, this approach can be seminal, 
as it enables us to take into consideration more factors and classify states into 
clusters according to their relative position in the power hierarchy of the 
international system.  
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
40 
Nevertheless, this procedure does not entirely eliminate the weaknesses of 
the positional approach either. Hence, the space for a scholar’s somewhat 
subjective approach will not be absolutely eliminated, as it very much depends 
on the value ascribed to the individual factors in the model. Finally, having 
certain material components of power does not need to be directly related to a 
state’s behaviour in international relations. Possessing some material capacities 
in a certain relation to other states does not mean that a state will behave in a 
certain special way.  
 
Table no. 1: Strengths and weaknesses of the positional approach 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Creation of hierarchy of states according to 
their material sources of power 
Problem of objectivity 
Power reduced to property of certain 
material resources 
Insufficient focus on a constructivist theory of 
foreign policy based on the logic of 
appropriateness 
Relatively easily quantifiable attributes such 
as size of the territory, population, human 
capital, economic indicators (GDP), military 
capacity, defence expenses, natural 
resources 
Difficulty with a precise measuring of a large 
number of factors 
Ability to use additional indicators such as 
cultural influence, diplomacy, science, 
education 
No direct relation between possession of 
certain material components of power and a 
state’s behaviour in international relations 
Necessity to perceive synergy of material 
and measurable factors 
 
 
2 The Identity-based Approach 
The identity approach takes into account the claims of political leaders on 
middle power status and public opinion. In this approach, a country regarding 
itself as a middle power is a middle power. Canada and Australia are typical 
examples of states adopting a self-conception as a middle power. At present, 
however, the set of states referring to themselves as middle powers is growing. 
Recently, this list has grown to include Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey (Engin-Baba, 2015; Wood, 1988; 
Pellicer, 2006; Belanger-Mace, 1997; Ping, 2005).The Foreign Affairs Ministers 
of Australia (H. Evatt (1941-1949), Sir G. Barwick (1961-1964), G. Evans 
(1988-1996), A. Downer (1996-2007), S. Smith (2007-2010), K. Rudd (2010-
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2012) and B. Carr (2012-2013) can be cited as examples of political 
representatives who consider their states to be middle powers.  
This constructivist-based approach is a major innovation, which has a 
number of strengths. According to M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, knowing how 
the state perceives its identity enables us to find out how the given state will 
behave (Finnemore-Sikkink, 2001). A particular role that a state assigns itself in 
the international system is an important variable in defining the state’s national 
interest and how it will use its available material resources of power to its 
advantage.  
 
Table no. 2: Strengths and weaknesses of the identity-based approach 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Adopting a self-conception as a middle power Lacking sustainable definitions 
Self-identity as a middle power as an 
important variable in defining: 
- the state’s behaviour in IR 
- the state’s national interest 
- the state’s way to use available material 
resources of power to its advantage 
 
Necessity to take into account the view of 
the political elite and population in terms of 
long-term identification of a particular state 
as a middle power  
 
Potential threat to reach the limits of the 
material power by pursuing interests in the 
international system 
 
The critics of this approach point out that although the identity-based approach 
is important in determining how the countries act, sustainable definitions of middle 
power would require a more stable foundation than can be provided by the state’s 
self-identification by its political representatives (Carr, 2014, p. 76). At least, when 
analysing the applicability of a particular state to the middle power category, one 
must take into account whether the majority of the political elite and most of the 
population have held long-term identification with this conception or whether it is a 
purely coincidental fluctuation in their moods. Furthermore, a state that regards 
itself as a middle power will definitely reach the limits of its material power if it 
pursues its interests in the international system. In addition, if a country’s power 
capacities correspond to small powers, it can neither accomplish its goals, nor will 
its behaviour ever correspond to the behavioural definition of middle power. 
Hence, the identity-based approach per se does not provide a satisfactory 
conceptual basis for the definition of middle power. 
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3 The Behavioural Approach  
M. Stephen rightfully states that “[t]he behaviour based definition requires 
observers to stipulate a set of behavioural indicators and then identify middle 
powers based on them” (Stephen, 2013, p. 36). The key work to understanding 
the nature of behavioural attitudes towards defining middle power is surely the 
early 1990s book Relocating Middle Powers by A. F. Cooper, R. A. Higgott, 
and K. R. Nossal. Rather than focusing on the capacities of middle power, the 
authors focus on a state’s behaviour in international politics, arguing that middle 
powers are typified by “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to 
international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in 
international disputes and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good 
international citizenship' to guide their diplomacy” (Cooper-Higgot-Nossal, 
1993).  
As Cooper observes, “[t]he classification of middle powers as a separate 
class of countries in the hierarchy of nations stands or falls not on their 
subjective identification but on the fact that this category of actors engages in 
some kind of distinctive form of activity” (Cooper, 1997). Nevertheless, this is 
definitely not the first attempt of this kind. B. Wood proposed five definitional 
roles of middle power: regional or sub-regional leader, functional leader, 
stabilizer, “free rider” or “status seeker” and, last but not least, a “good 
multilateral citizen” (Wood, 1988). These roles correspond to state-specific 
behaviour; hence, it is possible to argue that he perceives the issue of 
conceptualizing middle power similarly to Cooper.  
In general, the participation of middle powers in managing and resolving 
arising conflicts helps maintain a peaceful and stable international system (Cox, 
1989; Chapnick, 1999, p. 75; Gecelovsky, 2009, p. 78). Middle power behaviour 
is reflected in its tactics of compromise, asserting coalition decision-making, 
participation in international organisations, and reaching consensus in the 
international community (Stephen, 2013). The internationalism of middle power 
legitimizes the use of a state’s strengths. This increases the state’s importance 
in resolving the particular global issues for which it possesses sufficient 
capacities (Bothwell, 2011).  
Middle powers are characterized by their willingness and effort to engage in 
global matters. This stems from the need to overcome comparative differences 
in material resources of influence in comparison with resources possessed by 
superpowers. Middle powers rely on their credibility and make use of the 
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advantage of their technological skills, experience and national resources. 
Multilateral cooperation plays a primary role in their foreign policy, while their 
multilateral modus operandi stresses the need to act diplomatically only in a 
small number of special matters, balancing their national interests and potential 
opportunities for spreading their influence (Cooper, 2013). 
The basis of a middle power’s political actions is formed by soft power, as it 
guarantees attaining its goals in global politics. Despite the fact that some 
middle powers can have at their disposal greater hard military power than 
others, they hardly ever deploy military force to enforce something, as opposed 
to superpowers. Quite the contrary, by means of soft power, middle powers 
assert substantial influence in international relations through their use of 
diplomatic persuasion, information and communication technologies, and their 
prestigious reputation as credible and reliable actors (Behringer, 2013, p. 18). 
Soft power is used especially within niche diplomacy. Niche diplomacy is a 
specific form of diplomacy, which most thoroughly reflects a middle power’s 
political and economic interests in the world (The Public Diplomacy of Middle 
Powers, 2010). Niche diplomacy serves middle powers as a suitable means to 
implement their global goals, as they are not capable of using essential 
resources to assert their foreign policy within the global strategy (Alden-Vieira, 
2005, p. 1078). By means of niche diplomacy, middle powers undertake 
initiative in matters in which superpowers are not interested or which they 
overlook to a certain extent. This especially concerns social, economic and 
humanitarian matters, yet they can also be involved in initiatives in the security 
realm (Behringer, 2013). Cooper argues that “finding niche areas for middle 
powers is based on a functionalistic perspective rather than a normative one 
that regards middle powers as good multilateralists. Niche diplomacy based on 
this functionalism is particularly rational in the post-Cold War international order, 
where risks and opportunities inherent in moving from the rigidities of an old 
order toward the uncertainties of a new environment coexist. The specialized 
interests of middle powers and related experiences in differentiated issue-
specific tasks provide them the enhanced status and constructive roles in the 
related international system. Accordingly, middle power leadership and 
initiatives are based on their entrepreneurial and technical competence rather 
than their structural forces of power” (Cooper, 1997). Cooper et al. identified 
three ways in which a middle power can exercise niche leadership, i.e. as a 
mediator, catalyst or facilitator within the international system. In so doing, it 
again seizes the opportunity to spread its influence, solve problems pertaining 
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to its interests and in general differentiates its actions from the actions of 
superpowers (Cooper-Higgott-Nossal, 1993).  
J. Ravenhill summarized middle power behaviour using attributes of 
capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition building and credibility. In his 
understanding, the attribute of capacity is related to skills in the foreign services 
and the diplomatic apparatus. Concentration means focusing on some specific 
aspects of world policy, as middle powers are not capable enough to follow all 
foreign policy agendas. Creativity is understood as the ability to find new ways 
of negotiating consensus on complex issues. Coalition building is perceived as 
the only remaining strategy, as middle powers suffer from a lack of power in 
comparison with superpowers. Last but not least, in his approach, credibility 
means playing a constructive role in international politics and consistently 
following an international agenda. One very important innovation of this 
approach is the emphasis on combining these attributes, which transforms a 
small state into a middle power (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 310-313). 
Thus, the behavioural definition of middle power overcomes the main problem 
of the positional approach. This is because possessing certain material resources 
of power relative to the material resources of power of other actors is not the 
same as actively using them. Neither the behavioural approach, however, falls 
short of weaknesses. Let us take no notice of criticisms claiming that the entire 
behavioural approach to defining middle power is developed so that its criteria are 
met by states traditionally included amongst middle powers, i.e. Australia and 
Canada (Ungerer, 2007, p. 265). Even if this were so, it changes nothing about 
the fact that other states can also meet criteria established in this way; hence 
were the criticisms of this inclusion legitimate, the behavioural approach toward 
defining middle power would still make analytical sense.  
The uncertainty over how middle power differs in its behaviour from other 
categories of power is much more crucial. As A. Hurrell puts it, the behavioural 
definition predicts very few, if any, common patterns of behaviour, i.e. patterns 
of how middle powers will act on an international scale. This is justified by the 
diversity in the types of middle power regimes (Hurrell, 2000). However, how 
does one recognize in the empirical world that a state behaves like a middle 
power if cooperation, reaching compromises, participation in international 
organisations, concentration on specific problems (niche strategy) and agenda 
setting, in short all very general attributions of middle powers, also prevail in the 
behaviour of regional powers and small powers? In the real world, cooperation 
significantly prevails in the international system (as liberals point out), as conflict 
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can have a major impact on the form of the international system (aptly 
emphasized by realists and neorealists). Therefore, it is immensely difficult to 
distinguish between middle power and small power behaviour. 
Another question that needs to be answered is why do states in international 
politics act in the middle power way? One explanation for this emphasizes role 
conception (Hynek, 2004). Another possible explanation infers this style of 
behaviour from the limited sources of power possessed by middle powers. 
Multilateralism, regarded in this conception as the key sign of middle power 
(Ravenhill, 1998; Evans-Grant, 1991; Behringer, 2013; Cooper-Higgott-Nossal, 
1993) is obviously inevitable for middle powers, especially because of their 
insufficient capacity and inability to act unilaterally in the international scene. Yet 
owing to their interest in influencing international matters, participating in 
international events and contributing to the resolution of international disputes, 
they emphasize multilateral cooperation. In fact, this approach towards middle 
power conceptualization actually says that the particular middle power strategy 
results from the distribution of power. Hence, its proponents again revise the 
positional approach and it is questionable whether it is a real contribution to the 
conceptual debate. Furthermore, this conceptualization poses a problem when 
we regard every state acting and behaving as a middle power as a middle 
power, regardless of its capacity (Hynek, 2004, p. 37). 
 
Table no. 3: Strengths and weaknesses of the behavioural approach 
Strengths Weaknesses 
State identified as a middle power according 
to its engagement in a distinctive form of 
activity: 
- tactics of compromise  
- asserting coalition decision-making 
- participation in IOs 
- reaching consensus in the international 
community 
Developed criteria met by states 
traditionally included amongst middle 
powers 
Definitional roles of a middle power: regional 
or sub-regional leader, functional leader, 
stabilizer, “free rider”, “status seeker” and a 
“good multilateral citizen” 
Uncertainty over how middle power differs 
in its behaviour from other categories of 
power 
Focus on soft power especially within niche 
diplomacy 
Uncertainty over reasons why a state acts 
in the middle power way 
 Based on a certain cultural colonialism of 
the West 
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Last but not least, one can object that the behavioural approach to defining 
middle power is based on a certain cultural colonialism of the West, as certain 
constructive patterns of state behaviour in international relations, such as 
cooperation, ability to reach compromise and nonviolent resolution of disputes, 
are regarded as morally superior to others, especially to those that are less 
cooperative (Carr, 2014, p. 76). 
 
4 The Functional Approach  
The functional approach defines middle power as a state that, to a higher 
degree than other states, helps fulfil fundamental functions of the international 
system on the global stage. As is argued by P. Gecelovsky, middle power is more 
likely to use its capacities to pursue “milieu goals” than the narrow “possession 
goals” (Gecelovsky, 2009, p.78). This approach naturally raises the question of 
which functions of the international system should be performed by the state in 
order to be classified as a middle power. Even though there are a number of 
controversial issues among realists, liberals, constructivists and Marxists in the 
debate on the functions of the international system, there is a consensus within IR 
that the crucial function of the international system is to regulate and manage 
conflicts, maintain stability, and prevent outbreaks of violence. As Nossal 
highlights, the pursuit of milieu interests is consequently related to the 
commitment to internationalism. Internationalism is associated with both the 
willingness and the responsibility to adopt a constructive role in conflict resolution; 
to use multilateralism as a tool to minimize conflicts in international relations; and 
to meet commitments to international institutions and thus to support international 
institutions, using national resources for the system as a whole (Nossal, 2013). 
According to the functional approach, in certain areas in which it possesses 
sufficient capacities and abilities, a middle power can take on more 
responsibilities and use its abilities in favour of the entire international system, 
going beyond the region in which the middle power is located. Overall, we 
regard those states whose policies are formed in order to protect and boost the 
stability of the international system as middle powers. They do not endeavour to 
radically change the international balance of power and rarely adopt assertive, 
expansionist or conflicted political lines. This tends to make them appear more 
non-military, willing to manage international conflicts, and dependent on 
international trade. Hence, they tend to assume a useful international role 
(David-Roussel, 1998, p. 135). 
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However, the functional approach also makes it rather difficult to distinguish 
between the behaviour of middle power and other categories of power, 
especially the behaviour of superpowers. At present, this hegemon is 
represented by the USA; in the 19th Century, it was Great Britain. This hegemon 
helps fulfil fundamental functions of the international system for a number of 
various reasons going beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to identify empirically observed deviations of behaviour between the 
hegemon in the system and middle power, and to define middle power on this 
ground alone.  
 
Table no. 4: Strengths and weaknesses of functional approach 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Defining states that are able and willing to 
fulfil fundamental functions of the 
international system on the global stage 
Difficult to distinguish between the 
behaviour and functions of a middle power 
and other categories of power 
Applicable for general understanding of the 
middle power concept  
Vague and not objective enough in 
classifying states as middle powers 
 Not able to reflect changes in international 
order, thus lacking analytical exactness 
 
5 The Systemic Approach  
The review of the aforementioned approaches towards the conceptualization 
of middle powers implies that each of them shows certain insufficiencies, 
making it impossible to identify a clear set of signs differentiating middle power 
from other types of powers. Doing so requires a new definition or revision of the 
notion of power. While the behavioural and identity-based approaches avoid the 
issue of power, the positional approach sees power as a property/possession. 
Carr therefore introduces another approach to defining middle power – a 
systemic approach. This approach is based on measuring a state’s systemic 
impact and stems from Baldwin’s conceptualization of power as the ability of 
actors to influence their own behaviour. He also argues that the positional, 
behavioural and identity-based approaches have built an important foundation 
for the research of the middle power concept, yet the systemic approach can be 
better applied to the current classification of states as middle powers (Carr, 
2014, p. 79).  
Yet, the systemic approach fails to take into account the position of middle 
powers in the world system from the perspective of their material resources, 
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behaviour in the international system, or the rhetoric of their foreign policy. In 
accordance with R. O. Keohane (1969), by understanding power not as the 
possession of certain capacities but as the ability of Actor A to influence the 
behaviour of Actor B in a particular situation and to influence the basic 
parameters of the international system in an interaction, Carr focuses on the 
ability of middle powers to change and shape the basic parameters of the 
international system. Based on this approach, a middle power is a state that is 
able to defend its vital national interests and at the same time to significantly 
influence the main parameters of the existing world order. In his approach, Carr 
actually concentrates on the effect that the state’s activities have on the form of 
the system and the behaviour of other actors (Carr, 2014, p. 79).  
Nevertheless, a state’s ability to affect the basic parameters is a relative and 
not an absolute category. As a result, researchers may face much greater 
problems in measuring states’ abilities to influence the basic parameters of the 
international system than in the positional approach. Even though Carr’s 
approach does make sense from the perspective of a conceptual approach to 
power, doubts arise to what extent Carr’s innovation is applicable in practical 
research.  
 
Table no. 5: Strengths and weaknesses of the systemic approach 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
New definition / revision of the notion of 
power  
Problem with measuring states’ abilities to 
influence the basic parameters of the 
international system 
Going beyond the focus on material 
resources, behaviour in the international 
system and the rhetoric of the foreign policy 
  
Focus on the effect that state’s activities 
have on the form of the system and the 
behaviour of other actors 
 
 
6 Proposing a Complex Approach to the Study of Middle 
Powers  
None of the previous approaches towards the conceptualization of middle 
power is short of insufficiencies. Therefore, a complex approach toward defining 
middle power is proposed in order to, firstly, identify the gaps in the above 
analysed approaches and, secondly, to introduce an appropriate and applicable 
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definition of a middle power. The approaches using well-measurable indicators 
(the positional and identity-based approaches) do not grasp the entire 
complexity of the examined phenomenon (Hynek, 2004; Carr, 2014). The 
behavioural, functional and systemic approaches (Cooper-Higgot-Nossal, 1993; 
Gecelovsky, 2009) are more capable of depicting the complexity of this 
phenomenon, yet they suffer from major problems in operationalizing and 
measuring state performance and behaviour (Hurrel, 2000). The relevant 
parameters of these approaches, i.e. state behavioural patterns, influencing the 
form of the international system, and enhancing the ability to fulfil fundamental 
functions of the international system make sense as such. Their rigorous 
analysis is extremely complicated, as it is evidenced in the current state of 
academic debate.  
Every analysis of a state’s classification as a middle power should start with 
an analysis of its material sources of power. Overall, the material sources of 
power decide to a large extent a state’s actions in the international system, as 
they offer alternatives. States possessing lower relative power capacities than 
great powers but greater than small powers can choose how they will operate 
function in the international system and which of its functions they will fulfil 
(David-Roussel, 1998; Gecelovsky, 2009). Obviously, a similar conclusion can 
be applied to great powers and superpowers. States belonging, with their 
relative power capacities, among small powers do not have such a choice. They 
must act as a small power regardless of their identity and values. They will have 
to act in the international system just as the behavioural approach presupposes, 
i.e. act in accordance with multilateralism, promote crisis management, and 
appeal on the basis of moral power (Cox, 1989; Chapnick, 1999; Cooper, 2013). 
Owing to their relative weakness, any other option will not be viable for them. 
Small states cannot maintain all the key functions of the international system, as 
the functional approach maintains, nor can they influence the fundamental 
parameters of the international system, as the systemic approach stresses. In 
other words, an analysis of the relative position in the power hierarchy is crucial 
to identifying middle power. Moreover, the positional approach can be based on 
well-operationalized and measurable indicators describing material resources of 
power.   
However, the position on the power pyramid between great powers and 
small states does not say anything about whether a state will really use its 
capacities. The self-identification by both the political elites and the public of the 
particular state plays a great role here. From this point of view, power capacities 
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are a necessary but not sufficient condition to belong among middle powers. In 
his analyses of power distribution, Stephen downplays behaviour and does not 
consider self-identification (Stephen, 2013). However, the combination of 
material resources of power and a state’s self-identification with a certain role 
conception is, in our opinion, the key to the conceptualization of middle power. It 
is only worth talking about middle power in the case of countries that have 
power capacities relative to both great powers and small states and which self-
identify as middle powers. Only then does it become worthwhile to carry out the 
extremely complicated analysis of these states’ actions, their abilities to fulfil the 
fundamental functions of the international system, and their abilities to influence 
matters within that system.  
The ideal example of a middle power, in line with Weber’s ideal typology 
(Weber, 1998), fulfils the following characteristics: The state is – in terms of its 
power resources – located exactly between a superpower and a small state on 
the theoretical superpower / great power / middle power / small state scale (A). 
Hence, it is the evaluation of its relative, rather than absolute, power capacities 
in terms of its material resources of power that matters most. A vast majority of 
the political elite and the population self-identify as a middle power on a long-
term basis (B). There are certain patterns of state behaviour characteristic of 
middle powers in international politics (C). The state has the capabilities to help 
fulfil the fundamental functions of the international system (D). And last but not 
least, it has the ability to affect the form of the international system more than a 
small state but less than a superpower (E). Features (C) to (E) are difficult to 
operationalize, which complicates their use in an empirical research. However, 
the two-level approach makes it possible to exclude from the analysis those 
states that are clearly not middle powers, whether this is due to their relative 
position in the power pyramid or the lack of self-identification as a middle power 
by the political elites and population. 
Consequently, a middle power – seen through the lenses of the complex 
approach – should be able to impact the other state’s behaviour as well as the 
form and functioning of the international system. That has to be achieved 
through, firstly, its relative power position in the international system, measured 
by material resources of power, soft power and niche diplomacy, secondly, its 
self-identity and, thirdly, its value orientation.   
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Conclusion 
The conceptual debate on middle powers is very long, rich and varied. Its 
current state does not imply that it will end any time soon. The debate was 
initiated by political professionals requiring a certain position of privilege in the 
international system for states such as Australia and Canada. They used the 
middle power concept both as an argument to enhance their countries’ profile in 
the international political scene and a mobilization tool in domestic politics. The 
ongoing debate on emerging middle powers taking place in similar milieus 
confirms that this issue will remain on the agenda for some time to come. The 
complex approach towards the conceptualization of middle powers tries to 
employ the strengths of the previous approaches and overcome their 
weaknesses. The emphasis on the relative position of a state in the power 
pyramid is based on the belief that this position, in combination with value 
orientation and self-image, affects both the state’s actions and its ability to 
create conditions for the functioning of the international system and the ability to 
influence the basic parameters of the international system. Moreover, it is based 
on relatively easily measurable indicators, which improves the feasibility of 
research. Last but not least, it does not disqualify Australia and Canada from 
being classified as middle powers, which is also important in terms of the history 




ALDEN, CH. - VIEIRA, M.A. 2005. The new diplomacy of the South: South 
Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism. In Journal Third World Quarterly. vol. 26, 
2005, no. 7, p. 1077-1095. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500235678 
BALDWIN, D. A. 2002. Power and International Relations. In CARLSNAES, W., 
RISSE, T.-  SIMMONS, B. A. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. 
London: Sage Publication, 2002. p. 177–191.  
BEHRINGER, R. M. 2013. The Dynamics of Middlepowermanship. In Seton Hall 
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer/ Fall 2013, p. 9-22.   
BELANGER, L. - MACE, G. 1997. Middle Powers and Regionalism in the 
Americas: The Cases of Argentina and Mexico. In COOPER, A.F. (ed.) Niche 
Diplomacy. Middle Powers after the Cold War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1997. ISBN 0312176228. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25902-1_9 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
52 
BOTHWELL, A. 2011. Can Canada Still Be Considered a Middle Power? 
Zimbabwe and Canada’s Declining Global Role. University of Stellenbosch, 
2011. 
CARR, A. 2014. Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach. In 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, 2014, no. 1. ISSN 1035-
7718, p. 70-84. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.840264 
COOPER, A. F. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview. In COOPER, 
A. F. Niche Diplomacy. Middle Powers After the Cold War. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997. ISBN 978-0-333-68186-2. p. 1-24. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25902-1_1 
COOPER, A.F. - DAL, E.P. 2016. Positioning the third wave of middle power 
diplomacy: Institutional elevation, practice limitations. In International Journal, 
vol. 71, 2016, no. 4, p. 516–528. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702016686385 
COOPER, A.F. - HIGGOTT, R.A. - NOSSAL, K.R. 1993. Relocating Middle 
Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order. Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1993. 232 p.  
COOPER, D. A. 2011. Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power 
Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for Middle Power 
Theory. In Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 7, 2011. ISSN 1743-8586, p. 317-336. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00140.x 
COOPER, D. A. 2013. Somewhere between Great and Small: Disentangling the 
Conceptual Jumble of Middle, Regional and „Niche Powers”. In The Journal of 
Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. 14, 2013, no. 2, p. 23-33. 
COTTON, J. 2013. Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific: Korea in Australian 
Comparative Perspective. In Korea Observer, vol. 44, 2013, no. 4. ISSN 0023-
3919, p. 593-621. 
COX, R. 1989. Middlepowermanship, Japan and the Future World Order. In 
International Journal, vol. 44, 1989, no. 4. p. 823-862. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/002070208904400405 
DAVID, CH. P. - ROUSSEL, S. 1998. Middle Power Blues”: Canadian Policy 
and International Security after the Cold War. In The American Review of 
Canadian Studies, vol. 28, 1998, no. 1-2. ISSN 0272-2011 ,p. 131-156. . 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02722019809481566 
EHTESHAMI, A.- HINNESBUSCH, R. A. 1997. Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in 
a Penetrated Regional System. London: Routledge, 1997.  
ENGIN, B. - BABA, G. 2015. MIKTA: A Functioning Product of “New” Middle 
Power-ism? In Uluslararası Hukukve Politika, vol. 11, 2015, no. 42, p. 1-40. 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
   53 
EVANS, G. J. - GRANT, B. 1991. Australia’s Foreign Relations. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1991. 
FINNEMORE, M. - SIKKINK, K. 2001. Taking Stock: Constructivist Research 
Program. In Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 4, 2001, no. 1, p. 391-
416. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391 
FRÜHLING, S. 2007. Balancing Australia’s Strategic Commitments. In Security 
Challenges, vol. 3, 2007, no. 3. ISSN 2277 128X, p. 145-159.   
GECELOVSKY, P. 2009. Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian 
Foreign Policy. In Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 15, 2009, no. 1. ISSN 
1192-6422, p. 77-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2009.9673483 
HOLBRAAD, C. 1984. Middle Powers in International Politics. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1984. ISBN 978-1-349-06865-4. 234 p. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06865-4_1 
HURRELL, A. 2000. Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in 
International Institutions. In HURREL, A. et al. (ed.) Paths to Power: Foreign 
Policy Strategies of Intermediate States. Washington:  Latin American 
Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2000. p. 1-12.  
HYNEK, N. 2004. Canada as a middle power: conceptual limits and promises. 
In The Central European Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 4, 2004, no. 1. 
ISSN 1213-7715, p. 33-43.  
CHAPNICK, A. 1999. The Middle Power. In Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 
vol. 7, 1999, no. 2. ISSN 1192-6422, p. 73-82. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1999.9673212 
CHAPNICK, A. 2000. The Canadian Middle Power Myth. In International 
Journal, vol. 55, 2000, no. 2, p. 188-206. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200005500202 
JORDAAN, E. 2003. The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: 
Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers. In Politikon: 
South African Journal of Political Studies, vol. 30, 2003, no. 1. ISSN 0258-
9346, p. 165-181. https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282 
KEOHANE, R. O. 1969. Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International 
Politics. In International Organisation, vol. 23, 1969, no. 2, p. 291-310. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003160X 
LECHINI, G. 2007. Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation. In 
NACLA Report on the Americas 40.5 44, 2007. [online].[Accessed on 12.4.2018]. 
Available at http://www.ipc-undp.org/conference/ibsa/papers/ibsa7.pdf, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2007.11725377 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
54 
MELLOR, J. W. 1979. India: A Rising Middle Power. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1979. 
MORGHENTHAU, H. J. 1961. Politics among Nations: the struggle for power 
and peace. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1961. 618p. ISBN 9780394317120. 
MURRAY, R. W. 2013. Middlepowermanship and Canadian Grand Strategy in 
the 21st Century. In Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations, Summer/Fall 2013, p. 89-99.  
NAYAR, B. R. - PAUL, T.V. 2003. India in the World Order: Searching for Major-
Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808593 
NEACK, L. 1993. Delineating State Groups through Cluster Analysis. In The 
Social Science Journal, vol. 30, 1993, no. 3, p. 347-371. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0362-3319(93)90014-M 
NOLTE, D. 2010. How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and 
research topics. In Review of International Studies, vol. 36, 2010, no. 4. ISSN 
0260-2105, p. 881-901. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051000135X 
NOSSAL, K.R. 2013. The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: 
Internationalism in the Harper Era. In SMITH H. A., SJOLANDER C.T. (eds.) 
Canada in the World: Internationalism in Contemporary Canadian Foreign 
Policy, 2013. p. 21-35. 
NYE, J. S. 2002. The Paradox of American Power. Oxford: Oxford University, 
2002. ISBN: 9780195161106. 240 p. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0195161106.001.0001 
OZKAN, M. 2006. A new Approach to Global Security: Pivotal Middle Powers 
and Global Politics. In Journal of International Affairs, 2006. p. 77-95. 
PATIENCE, A. 2014. Imagining middle powers. In Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 68, 2014, no. 2. ISSN 1035-7718, p. 210-224. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.840557 
PELLICER, O. 2006. Mexico—a reluctant middle power? FES Briefing Paper, 
June 2006. [online]. [cit. 22.5.2018]. Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/50417.pdf 
PIKNEROVÁ, L. 2013. Jihoafrická republika jako nastupující střední mocnost. In 
Politologická revue, vol. 2, 2013, p. 48-75.  
PING, J. H. 2005. Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-
Pacific. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. ISBN 10: 0-754-644-677. 270p.      
 
 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
   55 
PRATT, C. 1989. Middle Power Internationalism and North-South Issues: 
Comparisons and Prognosis. In PRATT, C. Internationalism under Strain: The 
North-South Policies of Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1989. p. 194-200. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487579869 
RAVENHILL, J. 1998. Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in 
Australian and Canadian foreign policies. In Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 52, 1998, no. 3. ISSN 1035-7718, p. 309-327. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259 
ROZMAN, G. 2007. South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's 
options within the East Asian core triangle. In The Pacific Review, vol. 20, 
2007, no. 2, p. 197-220. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740701306840 
SAMHAT, N. 2000. Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: A Model for 
Managing World Politics with Lessons from Iran-U.S. Relations, 1962-77. In 
Policy Studies Journal, vol. 28, 2000, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-
0072.2000.tb02013.x 
SCHOEMAN, M. 2000. South Africa as an emerging middle power. In African 
Security Review, vol. 8, 2000, no. 3, p. 47-58. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2000.9628050 
STAIRS, D. 1998. Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles. In BOOTH, K. (eds.) 
Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. ISBN  0521474531, p. 270-286. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511558962.015 
STEPHEN, M. 2013. The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global 
Rebalancing. In Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 14, 2013, no. 2.  
TAN,A.T.H. 1999. Singapore's Defence: Capabilities, Trends, and Implications. 
In Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, 1999, no. 3, p. 451-474. 
https://doi.org/10.1355/CS21-3G 
The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers. 2010. Public Diplomacy Magazine. 
[online]. [cit. 21.3.2018]. Available at http://www.publicdiplomacymagazine. 
com/the-public-diplomacy-of-middle-powers/ 
TREVERTON, G. F. - JONES, S. G. 2005. Measuring National Power. Rand 
National Security Research Division, 2005. https://doi.org/10.7249/CF215 
UNGERER, C. 2007. The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy. 
In Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 53, 2007, no. 4. ISSN 0004-
9522, p. 538-551. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00473.x 
WALTZ, K. N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 
1979, 251 p. ISBN 978-1577666707. 
═════════════ Politické vedy / Studies ═════════════ 
 
56 
WEBER, M. 1998. Metodologie, sociologie a politika. Praha: Oikoymenh, 1998. 
354s. 
WIGHT, M. 1978. Power Politics. London: Continuum, 1978. 317 p.  
WOOD, B. 1988. The Middle Powers and the General Interest. Ottawa: North-
South, 1988. 
YALCIN, H. B. 2012. The Concept of Middle Power and the Recent Turkish 
Foreign Policy Activism. In Euroasian Studies, vol. 1, 2012, no. 1, p. 195-213.  
 
 
